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tion exist. 8  It is obvious that a taxpayer and transferee cannot
co-exist, as such status would presuppose two juristic persons, one
being primarily liable and the latter secondarily liable.19
Generally where a waiver purports to be executed for a dis-
solved corporation it is ineffective, 20 unless such power is given by
statute of the state of incorporation. 21  But the court will look at
the substance rather than the form of the transaction, 22 and it has
held that a waiver signed by the traisferee acting for the dissolved
traiisferror was valid 2 3 although the Statute of Limitations had ex-
pired; 24 though in the instant case the court strictly construed the
waiver.25  And so the court has held that a notice of assessment
naming the party as "taxpayer" instead of "transferee" was valid 26
and that such notice need not be signed by the Commissioner 27 nor
have any definite or special form.28
I. D.
TAXATION-GAIN OR Loss ON SECURITIEs HELD IN MARGIN
AccouNT.-Early in 1926, petitioner purchased on marginal account
a block of United Gas Improvement Company stock. In 1928, he
purchased additional stock of the same company and in subsequent
transactions he sold an amount equal to the number of shares he
" Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Weld County,
Colorado, 222 Fed. 651 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915).
19 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 68
F. (2d) 16 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
' Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Newport Co., 65 F. (2d) 925 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1933), rev'd on other grounds, 291 U. S. -, 54 Sup. Ct. 481 (1934) ;
cf. Wonder Bakeries Co., Inc. v. United States, supra note 7. "There is a
conflict in the decisions as to whether an officer and stockholders of a dissolved
corporation can file a waiver for it under any circumstances," but such a party
can file a waiver for the dissolved corporation that would be binding on
himself. Instant case.
' Helvering v. South Penn Oil Co., 68 F. (2d) 420 (App. D. C. 1933).
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Com-
merce Ass'n, 247 U. S. 490, 38 Sup. Ct. 553 (1918).
'Helvering v. Newport Co., 291 U. S. -, 54 Sup. Ct. 481 (1934). The
court, without discussion, dismisses the contra proposition as without merit.
' Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wolf Co., 69 F. (2d) 1001 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1934).
'The court ruled that all waivers, except the one for the year 1921, were
ineffective, and thus, it of necessity included the waiver executed by the
taxpayer as "transferee."
' Burnet v. San Joaquin Fruit & Investment Co., 52 F. (2d) 123 (C. C. A.
9th, 1931). But in this case the liability of the transferee was that of a
taxpayer.
'Riggs v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 50 F. (2d) 1082 (C. C. A.
3d, 1931); Helvering v. Continental Oil Co., 68 F. (2d) 750 (App. D. C.
1933).
1 Tameling v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 43 F. (2d) 814 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1930) ; Noyes v. United States, 55 F. (2d) 870 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932);
Ventura Consolidated Oil Fields v. Welch, 6 F. Supp. 327 (S. D. Cal. 1934).
TAX COMMENT
had bought in 1928, together with a stock dividend received in 1926.
At the end of 1928, he had the same number of shares which had
been purchased in 1926. He had kept his books on a basis which
indicated that stock purchased in 1926 was to be held for invest-
ment, and had related to his broker his intention to hold such shares.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed a deficiency tax
against the petitioner for the tax year 1928. On appeal -from de-
cision1 affirming the action of the commissioner, held, reversed. "First
in, first out" rule does not apply to sales of stock in margin account
where taxpayer instructed broker to exclude shares first purchased.
James L. Rankin, Executor of the Estate of Richard B. Turner,
Deceased v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, - F. (2d) -,
C. C. A. 3d, September 18, 1934.
In the case of marginal transactions, the general rule is that
stock sold shall be applied against earliest purchases to determine
gain or loss.2 While identification of actual shares sold is preferable,
a margin account is of a nature that makes it difficult, if not impos-
sible, to identify the lot sold, and therefore the general rule of first
acquired, first sold, usually applied.3  Evidence of intention of the
owner of shares in the transaction while not conclusive of the ques-
tion of identification has, nevertheless, a bearing on their disposi-
tion.4 In the instant case, the petitioner's communication to his
broker of his intention to exclude from sale the shares first pur-
chased were in effect an identification of the shares later sold as
those last purchased. The Commissioner erred in the theory that
the United Gas Improvement Company stock which from time to
time was purchased on margin, and later sold, could be identified
only by certificates, and that as no certificates for shares were ever
in the petitioner's name, the shares sold could not be identified as
126 B. T. A. 1204 (1932).
REv. AcT 1928 §113 (a). 45 Stat. 818, 26 U. S. C. 2113. Article 58 of
Regulation 74, "When shares of stock in a corporation are sold from lots
purchased at different dates and at different prices and the identity of the
lots can not be determined, the stock sold shall be charged against the earliest
purchases of such stock * * *."
'Towne v. McElligott, 274 Fed. 960 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Skinner v.
Eaton, 45 F. (2d) 568 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930), aff'g, 34 F. (2d) 575 (D. Conn.
1929), cert. denied, 283 U. S. 837, 51 Sup. Ct. 486 (1931). Wherein court
stated that cost of stock purchased may not be averaged or merged. Snyder
v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 57 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931), aff'g, 20 B. T. A. 778
(1930). Where broker's testimony that in keeping up taxpayer's margin he
sold shares last purchased, held, insufficient identification to render inapplicable
regulation that stock sold shall be charged against earliest purchases. Homer
v. Commissioner, - F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 3d, 1934); Commissioner v. Mer-
chants and Manufacturers Fire Insurance Co., - F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 3d,
1934); Stryker, 21 B. T. A. 561 (1930); Jenks, 22 B. T. A. 910 (1931);
Hendrick, 24 B. T. A. 444 (1931).
'Howbert v. Penrose, 38 F. (2d) 577 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930). This is the
only reported court decision, besides the instant case, in which the evidence was
held to support the taxpayer's contention that he sold specific shares of stock
and not those first acquired.
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shares purchased in any particular lot or at any particular time or
price. What was bought and sold were shares and not certificates.
Shares, as distinguished from certificates, are property capable of
identification. 5
Apparently, the decision renders more indistinct a present per-
plexing situation. If identification is to be of "shares" rather than
of "certificates," anomalous situations will arise where stock certifi-
cates owned outright may be delivered against sales but the identity
of these certificates will be disregarded since the taxpayer has de-
livered "shares." Likewise, by a mere instruction to the broker of
their intention, taxpayers may retain the certificate held outright and
"deliver" the "share" by an actual delivery of the certificate held in
their margin account. In view of the Revenue Act of 1934, a final
determination by the Supreme Court appears to be particularly
necessary at this time. 6
B. K.
INcOME TAX-SECTION 211(C) OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1928
CONSTRUED--MARKET VALUE.-A corporation in filing its income
tax return placed a trading value of $117 a share on stock which it
received in exchange for part of the corporate property. This valua-
tion was accepted by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the
gain accruing to the corporation from the exchange was taxed in
accordance with the statute.' Petitioner (corporation) seeks a re-
determination claiming that the valuation of $117 a share reported
in its return was due to an error and that the stock only had a market
value of $16 a share within the meaning of the statute.2 At a hear-
ing before the Board of Tax Appeals the only evidence adduced by
the corporation to support this valuation was the opinion of two
experts, whose testimony was not directly contradicted, although it
also was found as a fact that the stock had not been sold in twenty-
eight years. Petitioner appeals from a decision of the Board of Tax
Appeals denying the claim. Held, affirming decision of Board of
Tax Appeals-that where it appears that stock has not been sold for
twenty-eight years and as a result has no market whereby its price
can be established, the market value in such case is the fair and rea-
sonable value of the stock and evidence of the assets, earning capacity,
Snyder v. Commissioner, - F. (2d) - (C. C. A. -, 1934); MEYER,
THE LAW OF STOCK BROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES §42.
1 REV. AcT OF 1934 §117 provides for determination of gain or loss depend-
ing upon the length of time a capital asset is held. 48 Stat. 714, 26 U. S. C.
5117.
'REV. AcT OF 1928 §211 a, c; 45 STAT. 815, 818, 26 U. S. C. A. §2111
(a, c), 2113.2 REv. AcT oF 1928 §211 c; 45 STAT. 818, 26 U. S. C. A. §21-11 (c).
